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Constitutional Law-Power of Administrative Officer to
Revoke Driver's Permit-Personal Fitness as Test
In a recent Virginia case a portion of an ordinance authorizing
the chief of police to revoke the permit of any driver who "in his
opinion" becomes unfit to drive was held void, since it failed to lay
down any rule determining the fitness of the driver, and thereby
delegated a power of arbitrary discrimination to the officer.'
The broad principle covering this type of cases is that an ordi-
nance which vests arbitrary discrimination in an officer with respect
to the practicing of an ordinary lawful business without preserving a
uniform rule of action is unconstitutional. 2
The decisions are by no means uniform as to what constitutes a
sufficient rule of action. Any attempt to determine the sufficiency of
the rule by reference to the words employed will result in hopeless
confusion. However it has been held that when a general delegation
of the power of determination follows specific delegations on the
same subject the latter should be construed as limited to the field of
the former ;3 also if the courts decide that a more detailed rule would
tend to confuse rather than enlighten the officer, they will consider
this as a factor favoring the sufficiency of the rule as laid down.4
The courts themselves recognize the impracticability of reference to
the wording alone as a standard, especially where personal qualifica-
tions are involved. 5 As a result they tend to uphold a seemingly
arbitrary delegation of power to officials in this particular class of
cases.
A review of those cases construing 'personal fitness' ordinances
reveals that the courts resort to many factors outside the ordinance
itself in determining whether or not it lays down a sufficient rule of
action. There is a very apparent tendency to consider closely the
public interest to be subserved in the granting or refusal of a par-
ticular license. As the occupation or business approaches the border-
line of privilege wherein a license is fraught with danger to public
interest0 the courts uphold a wider range of discretion than when the
'Thompson v. Smith, Chief of Police, 154 S. E. 579 (Va. 1930).
SYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886).
" Forman v. State Board of Health, 157 Ky. 123, 162 S. W. 796 (1914).
'Ex Pare Kreutzer, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N. W. 595 (1925).
'Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. ed. 480
(1916) ; Ex Parte Kreutzer, supra note 4.
' Bizzell v. Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 357, 135 S. E. 50 (1926). (Clarkson,
J. distinguishes between those occupations or activities in which the "right"
to engage is a mere privilege and those activities in which the practitioner has
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occupation is purely a matter of private interest, subject to only a
limited degree of legislative restriction.7 It is submitted that the
present case was rightly decided since the individual has something in
the nature of a vested right to drive his private car.
One court, in considering whether or not a certain ordinance im-
posed an arbitrary power in an officer, considered, among other
factors, the hardship a refusal of the permit would impose on the
applicant.8
The tendency of the courts to become more liberal in the con-
struction of this type of statute can, to some extent, be attributed to
the growing complexity of our administrative government, necessitat-
ing a grant of greater discretionary powers to local authorities.9
WEX S. MALONE.
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Chain Store Tax
The recent case of The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
et al. v. Maxwell' held valid under both state and federal Constitu-
tions a statute2 declaring every person, firm or corporation operating
or maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establishments under
the same general management, supervision, or ownership to be a
chain store operator per se, and as such subject to a license tax, for
the privilege of engaging in such business, of fifty dollars ($50.00)
on each and every store operated in the state in excess of one. The
a vested right) ; Brunswick-Balke Co. v. Mecklenburg Co., 181 N. C. 386, 107
S. E. 317 (1921) (Operation of billiard parlor held privilege).
"In the following cases ordinances laying down apparently arbitrary pow-
ers of discrimination were held valid: Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217
Pac. 502 (1923) (peddlers) ; Minces v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N. W. 711
(1898) (gift, fire, and bankrupt sales) ; State v. Cohen, 73 N. H. 543, 63 Atl.
928 (1906) (dealers in junk); Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 (1900)
(sale of cigarettes) ; Clark v. McBride, 101 N. J. L. 213, 127 Atl. 550 (1925)
(employment agencies).8 Matthews v. Murphy, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S. W. 785, 786 (1901).
'Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal. App. 83, 238 Pac. 160 (1925); Ex parte
Kreutzer, supra note 4.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company et al v. Maxwell, Commis-
sioner of Revenue of North Carolina, 199 N. C. 433 (1930).
""Branch or Chain Stores. Every person, firm or corporation engaged in
the business of operating or maintaining in this State, under the same general
management, supervision, or ownership, two or more stores or mercantile
establishments, where goods, wares, and/or merchandise is sold or offered for
sale at retail shall be deemed a branch or chain store operator, shall apply for
and obtain from the Commissioner of Revenue a State license for the privilege
of engaging in such business of a branch or chain store operator, and shall
pay for such license fifty dollars ($50.00) on each and every store operated in
this State in excess of one." N. C. Pun. LAws (1929), c. 345, §162.
